Vitanuova for 2004 March

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So I went down to CPTWG in Los Angeles today (March 3). According to Southwest's web site, it costs $97 each way if you go down and back on March 3.

However, a round-trip with an overnight stay is much cheaper ($39 each way). If I went down on March 2 and back on March 3, or down on March 3 and back on March 4, it would be $39 each way.

So Shari had asked "When is the next meeting?".

I booked a round-trip OAK-LAX flight leaving the morning of March 3 and returning the evening of April 14. I also got a round-trip LAX-OAK flight leaving the evening of March 3 and returning the morning of April 14.

So this morning, I flew out of Oakland on a long (over a month long!) business trip. This evening, I flew out of Los Angeles on a second long (over a month long!) business trip.

My business trips will run concurrently for over a month (as I just said). Then, on the morning of April 14, I'll fly home to Los Angeles from my trip to Oakland. That evening, I'll fly home to Oakland from my trip to Los Angeles.

Sure enough, Southwest charged $39 per flight segment for the flights I booked this way. But if I'd booked a pair of OAK-LAX round trips (which would have me departing on the same physical airplanes at exactly the same times on exactly the same dates), it would have been $97 per flight segment, or up to $232 more.

I'm sure this trick has a name.

Cory and I had a lovely time recently meeting Charles Brownstein, who runs the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund. CBLDF (based in my hometown of Northampton, MA!) is one of the country's recently founded civil liberties organizations.

Well, OK, it's older than EFF. And like EFF, it's really stepped up its litigation and membership efforts recently. The Fund and ABFFE are the only non-profit organizations I know that defend first amendment rights specifically in a particular medium without also being an industry or trade association. (I guess you can say EFF does the same for the Internet. It's funny now to think of the Internet as a whole as a "medium".)

Comics and video games are (like software, I might say) not most people's prototypical examples of protected speech. (I'm thinking in terms vaguely reminiscent of Lakoff here, but not in a rigorous way.) Brownstein told me about many laws that are still on the books that specifically target comics: some prohibit entirely the depiction of particular subjects or points of view! A lot of people have now heard about the extensive government and industry censorship of comics earlier in this century, but it turns out that some of the laws were never actually repeealed. Now the defense of the video games and software will have to be left to others, but you can do something for the comics by making a donation to CBLDF. It's a worthy cause.

I had minor surgery on my left big toe on Thursday of last week. (The present discussion is about psychology and won't include any gory details!)

One really remarkable result was that I had my first clear personal experience of confabulation. Confabulation is a term for the mind's creation of false-but-plausible explanations for behavior, especially false memories that replace missing memories.

For example, someone who's lost memories might make up other memories to replace them (and then believe that the confabulated memories were real). People who've suffered from some kinds of paralysis, had split brain surgery, or (in a smaller number of cases, as I understand it) people who've had amputations all may sometimes confabulate explanations for how their body is behaving. Someone will ask them why they did something, or why they didn't do something, and so on. And the patients may respond with a completely wrong story that they completely believe. I don't have a good example of that, but I believe Oliver Sacks and others have written about quite a few cases.

The other situation I know where people may confabulate is posthypnotic suggestion. Supposedly people acting on or influenced by posthypnotic suggestions will naturally come up with rationalizations for their behavior that may have nothing to do with hypnosis (and may not have been part of the suggestion at all). But they don't think of themselves as rationalizing at all. They think they're just providing the correct explanation of what happened, of what they just did. (Douglas Adams has a somewhat over-the-top example of confabulation with hypnosis in one of his Dirk Gently books.)

My impression is that a key element of confabulation is that it is seamless and unconscious. That is, a confabulator isn't struggling to lie, or making any conscious effort to lie; and the confabulation is indistinguishable from a true memory or a correct explanation.

Here's how my confabulation went. My toe had been anesthetized with a local anesthetic. When the procedure was over, I stood up and started talking to Zack. I discussed with him whether or not I could walk comfortably. "Well, I really don't want to put any weight on my toe", I said. "I probably could, but I would rather keep all my weight off it and keep holding it in the air."

Having said this, I looked down at my foot and found that my toe was resting on the ground, and that I was already putting weight on it. I had misinterpreted the anesthesia as a deliberate decision on my part to hold my toe off the ground -- but of course I was doing no such thing, and I had made no such deliberate decision. In fact, I was standing perfectly normally. It was just the anesthetic that prevented me from feeling any weight on the toe. So I figured that if my toe felt like I was holding it off the ground, it must be off the ground and I must have chosen to hold it there.

Some people have suggested that most of our beliefs and most of the things we say are confabulations, that confabulation is actually our normal method of thinking.

We won Bunner again!

Oh, and we won Bunner again!

I love saying "We won Bunner". It's great that I get to say it all the time, because it keeps happening. I'd better set up another Bunner victory party soon.

I'm going to have a trusted computing panel at CFP in Berkeley on the morning of April 22. We're going to have people from IBM and AMD, and I've invited someone from Microsoft. The panel will be moderated by Danny Weitzner from W3C.

Wendy and I got to take a tour of SLAC that was set up by Riana. (I'm really sorry that we messed things up so that Riana herself didn't get to come.)

I occasionally wonder what the largest room I've ever been in was. Previously, I thought it was probably either (1) an auditorium or concert hall of some sort (like the San Francisco Symphony or the War Memorial Opera House), (2) the Jacob Javits convention center in New York City, (3) some kind of train station or airport facility, or (4) the Infinite Corridor at MIT, if you want to allow corridors. If you want to allow corridors and are just measuring by volume, I'm sure SLAC set a new record for me with the linear accelerator shed. But another room we were in (a decomissioned detector facility) was also quite vast and had an incredibly deep pit in the floor, so that it seemed to be a pretty decent contender in the non-corridor rooms category.

"In the television world, 'librarying' is a pejorative term; you can tell because it includes the much older pejorative term 'library'."

Speaking of libraries, Zack and I went down to the San Francisco Public Library on Saturday and got ourselves some library cards. Despite my vast admiration for librarians, I've used the public library systems in the places I've lived pretty infrequently, partly because I really like to own books if I can -- and that means Bookfinder and bookstores. (I did confirm the epigraph for my DeCSS Haiku essay over at the S.F. Main, and only a while afterward did I remember that I had originally come across it as part of the epigraph of Commodify Your Dissent.)

Now the San Francisco Public Library has been criticized by both Nicholson Baker and Don Marti for getting rid of paper books in favor of computers and other non-book facilities and resources. If I were ever criticized by Nicholson Baker and Don Marti over something, I'd be pretty anxious! And in fact the collection at S.F. Main is looking pretty small compared to UC Berkeley or compared to the New York Public Library. (It's probably very respectable in proportion to San Francisco's population, but not in proportion to its fame.)

I never used the Five College Consortium interlibrary loan, but I was actually eligble to make use of it for a while because of my little red Smith College Employee Dependent ID (one of the four photo ID documents I've ever possessed that depicts me without a beard). The Five College library system was particularly impressive because it included the entire collection of UMass Amherst. Even though I never actually requested anything, I used to have a great time searching the catalogue. (My Martin Gardner collection is finally better than the Five College Consortium's, but it wasn't easy!)

I borrowed Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego because Annalee told me to and I have to do what she says. Well, at least because I'm writing an article for her and she recommended Freud on group psychology. (My article is also, I hope, going to get to make use of my confabulation experience.)

Zack and I also ate at Tu Lan, making three meals in two weeks there for me.

I just spent about eight hours installing Gentoo Linux on a desktop machine I got from a friend. The installation went smoothly; it took so long because Gentoo compiles everything from source code. But I have a headache from watching so many hours of gcc output in reverse video.

Gentoo doesn't really have much of an installer. It's pretty much a matter of following some instructions in a text file. It's a great feeling to know that everything on your system has been locally compiled, though.

I may have mentioned that the system came to me installed with Windows XP, and that I used Windows for about a week -- my first time since 1996, with minor exceptions -- and took some notes on the experience. I'm going to write something up about that when I get the chance. It was really amazing. (Should I say "amusing, awful, and artificial"?)

I found notes on over a year's worth of web diary entries that I never finished. It's about 100k of notes in about 25 unfinished entries on what I think is about 100 topics (mostly politics, philosophy, and things I did this past year). I hope I can find the time to finish and post all of these!

(Normally what I do when I don't have time to finish an entry is !}|mail -s 'diary stuff' schoen on it, and it goes right into my mailbox where it sits around until I notice it again. So I need to do some serious spring cleaning on all that "diary stuff".)

I had a great weekend speaking at a trusted computing symposium at Brown University and visiting family and friends in New England. I ended up visiting over a dozen people in six cities in three states (which is not so hard considering the size of the states out there). Among other things, I got a tour of the Mortimer Rare Book Room at Smith College, where I saw the actual plate "Typus Arithmeticae" from which the graphic in my bookplate is taken. (It appears in the first encyclopedia, the Margarita Philosophica, which the Rare Book Room has. It's kind of a propaganda piece for Arabic numerals.)

The Rare Book Room also has Robert Recorde's Whetstone of Witte, the first book to use the equal sign. I enjoyed the introduction so much that I transcribed some of it with the idea of posting it here:

Although nomber be infinite in incresyng: so that there is not in all the worlde any thing that can excede the quantitie of it: nother the grasse on the ground, nother the droppes of water in the see, no not the small graines of sande through the whole masse of the yearth: yet maie it seme by good reason, that noe man is so experte in Arithmetike, that can nomber the commodities of it. Wherefore I may truly saie, that if any imperfection bee in nomber, it is bicause that nomber, can scarcely nomber, the commodities of it self. [...] And if any thing doe or maie exceade the whole worlde, it is nomber, which so farre surmounteth the measure of the world, that if there were infinite worldes, it would at the full comprehend them all. This nomber also hath other prerogatives, above all naturalie thynges, for neither is there certaintie in any thyng without it, nother good agremente where it wanteth.

I also brought back some Massachusetts maple syrup. Would anyone like to try some?

Since I flew United, I got to listen to air traffic control on my trip again. My latest question is why (as far I could tell) a center will sometimes ask pilots to contact that center on a particular frequency. It sounded like (say) Minneapolis Center would say "United 567, contact Minneapolis Center on one two three point four five". I got used to centers handing off flights from one to the next, but I'm still confused about what seemed to be a "contact me" phenomenon.

I found it very exciting that the American Anthropological Association chose to make a statement about gay marriage:

Arlington, Virginia; The Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association, the world's largest organization of anthropologists, the people who study culture, releases the following statement in response to President Bush's call for a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage as a threat to civilization.

"The results of more than a century of anthropological research on households, kinship relationships, and families, across cultures and through time, provide no support whatsoever for the view that either civilization or viable social orders depend upon marriage as an exclusively heterosexual institution. Rather, anthropological research supports the conclusion that a vast array of family types, including families built upon same-sex partnerships, can contribute to stable and humane societies.

The Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association strongly opposes a constitutional amendment limiting marriage to heterosexual couples."

This is to say that people who study the way people actually live find that there are so many different ways and that these are astonishingly diverse. And it is hard for that observation to avoid undermining our confidence in the way we live, even if anthropologists insist that it wasn't meant to do that. Of course this leads me back to my strange sympathy for Scalia's position in dissent in Lawrence v. Texas. I just read in Sigmund Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego:

This self-love works for the preservation of the individual, and behaves as though the occurrence of any divergence from his own particular lines of development involved a criticism of them and a demand for their alteration.

Let's say that again in a simpler way. When people are different, we feel threatened and criticized by their difference. We feel that their difference is an attack on us and we feel defensive. (One reason for that could be that if we feel that the way we are is a result of a moral choice, people who are different are implicitly advocating their choice as better and criticizing ours. If I say that some activity is good, not just that I happen to like it, someone who pursues some other activity is in some way throwing my value judgment into doubt, or exposing it to scorn. This can be as simple as reading vs. watching television: the rivalry between the two for people's attention, and the views of the partisans of or participants in each, can immediately take on moral dimensions. I have five or ten books here that take my side of the question and really do take it morally and personally.)

(There is also the question of progress. If I think of some technology or practice as progress or an improvement over others, someone who doesn't use the technology, or who doesn't engage in the practice, is challenging my claim. The Amish, at an extreme, challenge our view that we are getting better by inventing new ways of doing things. The vastly peaceable Amish are vastly threatening.)

I think it's important to recognize that differences can be a kind of challenge. When we act and believe that our actions have some kind of meaning or significance, learning about other ways of doing things can seriously threaten our beliefs. (This is somewhat akin to the way that The World's Sixteen Crucified Saviours by Kersey Graves turns out in context to be an attack on Christianity. That book is open to a great deal of criticism, but it suggests that the gospels' stories about Jesus are not historically unique.) Do people really feel -- without effort -- that necessary things are not more valuable than contingent things, or that unique things are not more valuable than common?

Our culture, at the very least, contains a reverence for uniqueness which works against diversity. I'm sure anthropologists and sociologists have already thought for many years about the comparison to precious metals which (especially under mercantilist economics, but not exclusively) have been thought valuable because they are rare. When we think of things as better and more valuable when they are rare or unique, we apply a logic exactly opposite to that of the song about the magic penny. And I think this logic goes deeper than we can possibly imagine.

Well, there's something to try to track down. Meanwhile, the anthropologists' observation has force: "[...] No support whatsoever for the view that either civilization or viable social orders depend upon marriage as an exclusively heterosexual institution."

(Thanks to Biella for letting me know about the statement.)

Let me preface my somewhat abstract discussion of this by saying: about six years ago some people were shot, and some people's homes were destroyed.

Judge Illston last week denied ChevronTexaco's motion to dismiss Larry Bowoto v. ChevronTexaco and ruled that the case can go forward to trial. In her decision, she cited my declaration in that case!

Bowoto is a case under the Alien Tort Claims Act, from the days when laws were short and lawsuits brief:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.

(That's the entirety of the Act.)

The case deals with military attacks against Nigerian protesters on the Chevron oil platform at Parabe, Nigeria, and villagers in Opia and Ikenyan, Nigeria, in 1998 and 1999. You can read about the case and the attacks on the EarthRights International home page, and you can also find ChevronTexaco's view of the Parabe incident (which doesn't address Opia or Ikenyan).

EarthRights has also published Judge Illston's order, which mentions my declaration. I am very honored to have had a part in this case.

The Supreme Court has just now heard arguments in a separate case called Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain relating to whether the Alien Tort Claims Act can be used today to address violations of international law. It will be really interesting to see what the Court does with that case.

Vitanuova for 2004 March

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